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on Ecosystem Management, Part IV:
Narrowing and Sharpening the Questions
J.B. RUHL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The back and forth of serious scholarly dialogue is difficult to
capture in the printed pages of law journals, even in symposium
issues in which commentaries on principal papers are included.
Hence I have enjoyed the unusual opportunity the PACE ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW REVIEw has provided Professor Bruce Pardy and me
to engage in a spirited debate over the contours of ecosystem man-
agement ("EM"). Professor Pardy published an intriguing dis-
course on EM in this journal several years ago.1 I responded with
a series of objections. 2 Professor Pardy in turn replied in Ecosys-
tem Management in Question: A Reply to Ruhl3 by identifying
common ground and emphasizing old and new differences. In this
fourth installment of the dialogue, I will attempt to distill what
appears to be the intractable gap between us, with the purpose of
inviting other scholars and practitioners of environmental law to
weigh in. Before delving into our disagreements, however, I
should add that one incidental but not unimportant benefit of this
* Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, The Florida State University
College of Law, Tallahassee, Florida. Ali Stevens, FSU Class of 2007, provided valua-
ble research assistance, and the Florida State University College of Law sustained my
research through financial and other support. Please direct all comments or questions
to jruhl@law.fsu.edu.
1. See Bruce Pardy, Changing Nature: The Myth of the Inevitability of Ecosystem
Management, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 675 (2003) [hereinafter Pardy, Changing
Nature].
2. See J.B. Ruhl, The Myth of What Is Inevitable Under Ecosystem Management:
A Response to Pardy, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 315 (2004).
3. Bruce Pardy, Ecosystem Management in Question: A Reply to Ruhl, 23 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (2005) [hereinafter Pardy, Ecosystem Management in Question].
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dialogue has been that Professor Pardy and I have gotten to know
each other outside the pages of the law review and-I think I can
speak for him-agree that this is a positive and productive way to
explore the topic, even if ultimately we will have to agree to
disagree.
II. REPLY
Professor Pardy identifies a few issues upon which, I concur,
we agree: "(1) that environmental protection in its broad sense is
important and should be ecosystem-based; (2) that ecosystem mis-
management is undesirable; (3) that government has a role in en-
vironmental protection; and (4) that he [meaning I] and other
advocates of EM believe that EM is inevitable."4 That easy part is
now behind us. As for disagreements, they strike me as boiling
down to three related themes Pardy develops in Ecosystem Man-
agement in Question:
1. Pardy portrays EM as "anathema to a rule- or precedent-
based system of law."5
2. Pardy argues that an ecosystem-based legal system using
"natural/unnatural" as its core decision making criterion
will be more likely than EM to avoid ecosystem
degradation. 6
3. Pardy argues that EM is more susceptible to "arbitrary en-
vironmental decisions" promoting utilitarian goals than
would be a system "governed by general rules."7
A. On the Nature of Management and Rules
Pardy describes EM as "a particular kind of process in which
decision-makers have broad discretion to weigh conflicting priori-
ties to craft appropriate results one situation at a time to fit spe-
cific facts about the system under consideration."8 He then leaps
to the conclusion that, because of these features, "EM is anathema
to a rule- or precedent-based system of law."9 I find this ironic
because his description of the decision-making process of EM is on
point, but it would also be on point as both a description of much
of the rule-based statutory regime of environmental law as imple-
4. Id. at 210.
5. Id. at 212.
6. Id. at 213-14.
7. Id. at 214-17.
8. Id. at 212.
9. Id.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/2
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mented and precedent-based common law in general. Could not
both of these institutions also be described as involving decision-
makers with broad discretion to weigh conflicting priorities, one
situation at a time, in order to craft appropriate results to fit spe-
cific facts about the system under consideration?
The flaw in Pardy's reasoning is that he believes that EM,
unlike statutory regimes administered by agencies and common
law regimes administered by courts, is "not based on general
rules, . . .but is instead indeterminate and ad hoc." 10 I cannot
avoid making the observation that truckloads of law review arti-
cles have been written about how statutory and common law re-
gimes, notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) their "general
rules," produce indeterminate and ad hoc results.11 My quarrel
with Pardy, however, is over his description of EM as not being
based on general rules. On this point, Pardy is gravely mistaken.
In the first place, let us be clear about one thing: EM is not
the invention of lawyers. EM arose as a management theory and
technique employed by scientists and resource management pro-
fessionals.1 2 EM is almost universally embraced in those disci-
plines, 13 and I get the irppression that these professionals believe
they are following "general rules." Their general rules, of course,
are the rules of science-the scientific method and its protocols of
hypothesis generation, experimentation, data analysis, peer re-
view, publication, and verification.1 4 To the extent EM finds the
scientific method at its core, therefore, it follows general rules.
10. Id.
11. Citations for this proposition are legion. For example, the search "indetermi-
nacy & da(last 5 years)" in the Westlaw TP-ALL database yielded over 2400 docu-
ments. See, e.g., Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 475 (2005); Mark R. Kravitz, The Vanishing Trial: A Problem in
Need of a Solution, 79 CONN. B.J. 1, 14 (2005); Michael C. Doff, Legal Indeterminancy
and Institutional Design, 78 N:Y.U. LAW REV. 875 (2003).
12. For thorough histories of the scientific origins of the emergence of ecologically-
oriented statutes and the development of ecosystem management law in general, see
RICHARD 0. BROOKS, Ross JONES, & Ross A. VIRGINIA, LAW AND ECOLOGY: THE RISE
OF THE ECOSYSTEM REGIME (2002); JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF
BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 361-409 (2d ed. 2006).
13. See generally Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Soci-
ety of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECO-
LOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665 (1996).
14. Holly Doremus provides a concise summary of the scientific method:
Procedurally, science is a formalized system for gathering and evaluating
information about the world. Its essential steps are observation, commu-
nication, informed criticism, and response. A scientist gathers data
through observation or experimental manipulation. She then communi-
cates those data, together with an explanation of the methods used to
3
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Perhaps only legal rules matter to Pardy. I agree that EM
cannot simply be about letting the scientists run wild. EM cannot
continuously avoid the ubiquitous need in environmental protec-
tion law to make policy judgments based on less than complete
scientific information, or even based on a wealth of scientific infor-
mation but in contexts in which trade-offs force choices. 15 Here,
however, Pardy sets up a straw man by suggesting that an advo-
cate of EM must also necessarily advocate against using rules for
making such policy judgments, as if an EM statute must be lim-
ited to saying just "perform ecosystem management." I know of no
advocate of EM that has proposed this approach. Rather, EM is to
be practiced within a set of criteria established through authoriz-
ing statutes and regulations, such as requirements to "maintain
and enhance wetland functions within a watershed" or to "pro-
mote recovery of endangered species." I assume Pardy would not
object to such statutory directives. To suggest that using them
means we are not engaged in EM is no less than a mischaracter-
ization of EM.
The reality is that Pardy's fixation on "general rules" misses
the point of an ecosystem-based approach entirely. The real ques-
tion is whether the decision-making approach can respond to the
dynamic features of ecosystems and the threats to them. Simply
having general rules does not guarantee that such rules are neces-
sarily right for the critical challenges of an ecosystem-based ap-
proach to environmental protection. I wonder what set of general
ecosystem-based rules Pardy would propose for dealing with inva-
sive species or the effects of climate change, for example. The
sheer complexity of such problems and their resistance to com-
mand-and-control rules has led many EM advocates to incorporate
"adaptive management" ("AM") techniques as the "general rules"
of policy implementation. 16 AM is a methodology that relies on
gather them, to the community of scientists in her field. The scientific
community reviews and critiques the work, commenting in ways that
may inspire the original scientist and others to seek additional data or
alternative explanations.
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Sci-
ence Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1057 (1997).
15. Uncertainty and trade-offs plague environmental policy. See generally Daniel
A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Un-
certainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003).
16. There is broad consensus today among resource managers and academics that
adaptive management is the only practical way to implement ecosystem management
policy. See Ronald D. Brunner & Tim W. Clark, A Practice-Based Approach to Ecosys-
tem Management, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48 (1997); Anne E. Heissenbuttel,
[Vol. 24
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building models of ecosystem dynamics and then using rigorous
testing, monitoring, and evaluation of policy implementations to
provide the feedback necessary to promote long-term ecosystem
integrity. 17 Of course, the central purpose of this application of
AM is to promote the goal of EM. This leads to the next issue-
what are we trying to manage?
Ecosystem Management-Principles for Practical Application, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICA-
TIONS 730, 730 (1996); Paul L. Ringold et al., Adaptive Monitoring Design for Ecosys-
tem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 745, 745-46 (1996). Indeed, the
Ecological Society of America's comprehensive study of ecosystem management treats
the use of adaptive management methods as a given. See Norman L. Christensen et
al., The Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis
for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665 passim (1996).
17. See generally ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S.
Holling ed., 1978). It is universally agreed that adaptive management theory traces
its origins to Holling's influential work. See, e.g., Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adap-
tive Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Pro-
gram, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986) (tracing the term "adaptive management" to
Holling's book). The biologist Simon Levin recently defined adaptive management
concisely as "maintaining flexibility in management structures and adjusting rules
and regimes on the basis of monitoring and other sources of new data." SIMON A.
LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION 200 (1999); see also Simon A. Levin, Towards a Science of
Ecological Management, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 6, A3 (1999), available at http://
www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/art6 (discussing Holling's arguments). A more detailed
description is found in a recent report by the National Academy of Science's research
arm, the National Research Council, in its investigation of the Missouri River
ecosystem:
The concept of adaptive management promotes the notion that manage-
ment policies should be flexible and should incorporate new information
as it becomes available. New management actions should build upon the
results of previous experiments in an iterative process. It stresses the
continuous use of scientific information and monitoring to help organiza-
tions and policies change appropriately to achieve specific environmental
and social objectives.
COMM. ON Mo. RIVER ECOSYSTEM SCI., WATER SCI. & TECH. BD., DIV. ON EARTH & LIFE
STUDIES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING THE
PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 18-19 (2002), available at http://books.nap.edu/books/
0309083141/html. More recently, the National Research Council, at the request of
several federal agencies, convened a committee of scientists to explore how adaptive
management might be used to improve resource agency decision making in the Kla-
math River Basin, which straddles southern Oregon and northern California. The
Committee outlined eight steps of adaptive management: (1) definition of the prob-
lem, (2) determination of goals and objectives for management of ecosystems, (3) de-
termination of the ecosystem baseline, (4) development of conceptual models, (5)
selection of future restoration actions, (6) implementation of management actions, (7)
monitoring and ecosystem response, and (8) evaluation of restoration efforts and pro-
posals for remedial actions. See COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED FISHES IN
THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, BD. ON ENVTL. STUDIES & TOXICOLOGY, DwV. ON EARTH &
LIFE STUDIES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN
THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY 333-
35 (2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309090970/html. In the interests
of full disclosure, I was a member of the so-called "Kiamath Committee."
5
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B. On the Nature of Natural and Unnatural
Pardy condemns EM as relying on an anthropocentric "desira-
ble/undesirable" dichotomy, which he proposed replacing in his
"general rules" regime with a purportedly ecocentric "natural/un-
natural" dichotomy.' He concedes that "the enterprise of defining
the line between 'natural' and 'unnatural' is difficult," but this will
be better than "the discretionary and politically laden judgment
calls between 'desirable' and 'undesirable."'" 9
My first reaction is that Pardy has simply given different la-
bels to "desirable" and "undesirable." In essence, he has decided
that "natural" is desirable and "unnatural" is undesirable. Pardy
observes that a forest does not care what kind of forest it is. 20
True enough, but a forest also does not know whether it is natural
or unnatural. Is a forest ecosystem that has been disrupted by an
invasive species natural or unnatural according to Pardy's propo-
sal? Only Pardy can say-i.e., only humans can define what is
natural and unnatural. Thus, Pardy's natural/unnatural dichot-
omy is every bit as anthropocentric as anything advocates of EM
have proposed.
Pardy claims to have escaped this problem by "articulat[ing] a
meaning for 'natural' based upon the economic analogy of a per-
fectly competitive marketplace," 2 ' as if this supplies some sort of
objective, non-normative reference point. I must point out that,
whereas ecosystems actually exist, perfectly competitive market-
places exist only in theory. Much of neoclassical economics is de-
voted to identifying reasons why perfectly competitive markets do
not exist, and much of ecological economics is devoted to explain-
ing why, given that perfectly competitive markets do not exist, the
markets we do have perform poorly for purposes of maintaining
sustainable ecosystems. 22
In any event, Pardy uses neoclassical economic theory to anal-
ogize between "disproportionate influence" behavior in the mar-
ketplace and cases of "disproportionate influence" behavior by
humans interfering in ecosystems. 23 The problem is that econo-
mists do not agree in theory, much less in application, about the
18. Pardy, Ecosystem Management in Question, supra note 3, at 213-14.
19. Id. at 214.
20. Id. at 213.
21. Id. at 214.
22. See generally HERMAN E. DALY & JOSHUA FARLEY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS:
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS (2004).




normative effects of "disproportionate influence" in the market be-
cause one first has to agree on what is desirable in the market-
place-e.g., consumer welfare, productive capacity, distributional
equity, etc. 24 Likewise, one also has to agree that "naturalness"
(or something else) is desirable, define what it is, figure out a way
to measure it, and agree when it has been disproportionately in-
fluenced before one can even begin to test for Pardy's "dispropor-
tionate influence" criterion for ecosystem-based decisions. This
does not strike me as an inquiry free of "discretionary and politi-
cally laden judgment."25
In short, naturalness is a human conception. We can disagree
over what it means. We can also disagree over when it ever ex-
isted, over how far we are from it, and over what would have to be
done to move any particular ecosystem closer to it. As such,
Pardy's natural/unnatural dichotomy cannot deliver an objective,
non-anthropocentric benchmark that will save ecosystem-based
environmental protection law from "the discretionary and politi-
cally laden judgment calls between 'desirable' and 'undesir-
able."' 26 This leads to the final theme-if discretion is inevitable
under both Pardy's and my approaches, which approach uses dis-
cretion more effectively?
C. On the Nature of Discretion
I detect throughout Pardy's Ecosystem Management in Ques-
tion that what really motivates his assault on EM is a deep fear of
discretion. The word or its derivative appears eleven times in his
nine-page article (and never in a nice way). He characterizes EM
as depending on a "professional elite" wielding "its own technical
or political judgment" and capable of making "arbitrary environ-
mental decisions" with little accountability.2 7 He believes, I as-
sume, that his regime of "general rules" and "natural/unnatural"
dichotomies is immune from such defects.
I have many concerns with his depiction of our two ap-
proaches in this regard. First, how does Pardy measure discre-
tion, as he must to claim what he does? Is there a discretion
meter? The text of a statute is no reliable guide-more than one
24. See DALY & FARLEY, supra note 22, at 37-50.
25. Pardy, Ecosystem Management in Question, supra note 3, at 214.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 217.
2007]
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court has interpreted "shall" to mean "may."28 So it remains un-
clear how Pardy is distinguishing between our two proposed ap-
proaches on the basis of the quantity of discretion.
More importantly, how does Pardy propose that ecosystem-
based decisions-which frequently involve incomplete scientific
information and trade-offs, not only between ecological and eco-
nomic interests, but also between ecological and ecological inter-
ests-are going to be made without the exercise of discretion? If
he is suggesting that there is some set of general rules which, with
the aid of his natural/unnatural dichotomy, will decide every fu-
ture ecosystem-based decision without requiring anyone to exer-
cise discretion, then he is suffering from a severe case of legal
formalism.
If, on the other hand, he concedes that discretion is inherent
in the process, but it is the "professional elite" quality of discretion
that concerns him about EM, to whom would he delegate the dis-
cretion? Will legislatures decide, for example, whether to grant
each wetland development permit? Will judges decide? Will vot-
ers decide? In fact, Pardy gives us a taste of how his system would
work in this regard in his proposal, prepared outside of this dia-
logue, for an "Ecological Sustainability Act." 29 The core of the
statute would be "ecological sustainability," which he defines as
"the absence of permanent change caused by human impact in an
ecosystem of any size within which the impact is found."30
Through a system of civil and criminal liability with judicially im-
posed remedies, the statute would punish anyone causing "perma-
nent change" unless such change would not be permanent in a
"larger encompassing ecosystem," is designed to restore the
ecosystem back to pre-permanent change conditions, or meets
other exceptions based on human health.31
While his proposal includes many intriguing features and his
discussion of ecosystem-based decisions contains valuable in-
sights, Pardy does not solve the defects that he alleges plague EM.
His proposal uses general rules only in the most basic sense, and
it is brimming with indeterminate terms judges would have dis-
28. See generally 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 368 (2007); 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 57:3 (6th ed. 2006).
29. See Bruce Pardy, In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law: A Rule to
Solve the Problem, 1 McGILL INT'L J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. & POL'Y 29 (2005) [herein-
after Pardy, In Search of the Holy Grail].





cretion to interpret. 32 Moreover, his proposal introduces new
problems not associated with EM. As a liability-based system,
Pardy's proposal is retrospective rather than prospective. 33 It im-
poses the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove permanent
change. 34 In short, his proposal faces all the transaction costs and
other foibles of litigation-based solutions.35 Finally, and ironi-
cally, it is also grounded in the same default principle that guides
EM-"that permanent change to ecosystems caused by human so-
ciety should be prevented."36 This is what leads me to conclude
that Pardy's primary quarrel with EM isn't over "general rules" or
what is "desirable/undesirable" but, instead, is merely over who
has the discretion to decide how it is implemented.
I agree (and have said many times) that the way in which
discretion is distributed and exercised in an EM approach is dif-
ferent from the statutory regime and common law approaches,
and that it will rely heavily on administrative exercise of profes-
sional judgment.37 However, I cannot agree that an EM approach
has "more" discretion or a higher potential for arbitrary exercise of
discretion. More than a few people are rather dissatisfied with
the way discretion has been exercised in numerous statutory envi-
ronmental law regimes, and not just by agencies but by judges as
well. 38 Similarly, although I am an avid promoter of the common
law in environmental contexts, 39 I also recognize that it has sub-
stantial limitations, not the least of which is the nature of judicial
discretion. While democratic values are claimed to be near and
dear to environmentalism, I know of few serious proposals to put
all ecosystem-based decisions to a popular vote. I am afraid, Pro-
fessor Pardy, that discretion is inherent in any ecosystem-based
decision making regime, and neither you nor I have solved the
32. Statutory regimes, whether rule or liability based, cannot avoid the need for
judicial interpretation. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 111-59 (1990).
33. See id. at 55-57 (proposing only liability-based remedies).
34. See id. at 55.
35. See DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTI-
TUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 100-04 (2002).
36. Pardy, In Search of the Holy Grail, supra note 29, at 57.
37. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is It Possible?, 7
MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 21 (2005).
38. For a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of statutory and com-
mon law regimes, see Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environ-
mental Regulation?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 515 (2002).
39. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Toward a Common Law of Ecosystem Services, 18 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 1 (2005).
2007]
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puzzle of how to have it but ensure that it is never exercised
arbitrarily.
III. CONCLUSION
I have to confess that I remain more than a little bit puzzled
by Pardy's opposition to EM. Although we agree on much about
the nature of and need for ecosystem-based approaches to environ-
mental law, he goes out of his way to portray EM as an idea de-
vised by a power-hungry scientific elite aligned with dark political
interests in order to serve their purely utilitarian goals without
any measure of accountability. Ironically, one other strident oppo-
nent of ecosystem management, Allan Fitzsimmons, condemns it
as an idea formulated by a power-hungry scientific elite aligned
with dark political interests in order to serve their purely environ-
mental goals without any measure of accountability. 40 EM must
be doing something right if it can attract condemnation from both
ends of the spectrum!
I believe the difference between Pardy and myself boils down
to conceptions of the appropriate distribution of discretion in deci-
sion-making. Pardy wants to cling to the old command-and-con-
trol system of statutes and rules, although that system has failed
to advance an ecosystem-based approach. It's not working,
largely, because the way in which it channels discretion will never
produce an ecosystem-based approach. More of the same won't
change what's wrong with the "general rules" command-and-con-
trol system in this sense.
So let it go, Professor Pardy. Move on. Give EM a chance.
40. See ALLAN K. FITZSIMMONS, DEFENDING ILLUSIONS: FEDERAL PROTECTION OF
ECOSYSTEMS (1999).
[Vol. 24
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